On the other hand, although representing the theoretically rational course of action, the Nash equilibrium poses several concerns regarding its interpretation.Looking at the example scenario in Section 8, it is interesting to see how q and s varies depending on ® which is shown in the diagram in Fig. 7, i.e., how the solution to our decision problem varies depending on our subjective beliefs regarding the opponent being superior or inferior. How do we convince a commander that he should decide what to do by throwing a die that varies depending on q(®)? He probably understands that he is bluffing, and that it is in general disadvantageous both to always bluff and to never bluff. Without knowing
the background to the solution it is not trivial to understand why player 1 should raise with a losing card with probability q(®) in Fig. 7. Perhaps even more strange is that player 2’s counterattack, the probability s(®)to meet, is kept constant at s(®)=2=3 until ® =3=4when it suddenly goes down to zero. So there is a discontinuity in the optimal strategy when ® varies, although at the discontinuity the optimal utilities vary continuously. Hence, an error in the ® estimate has no large utility effect although the equilibrium solution strategies may vary significantly. The conclusion regarding the Myerson card game is that a simple problem gives us a solution that is difficult to understand intuitively and that may or may not, dependent upon the decision-maker’s objective, raise questions regarding robustness. This is quite typical, see for example [6] for another example,and we need to address the question of how to use the solution in a sensible way. 请高手帮我翻译下上面这段话,本人能力不行,望高手帮忙,急!!!! |
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